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the legislative branch. Henceforth, individuals or groups seeking a judicial
resolution of difficulties considered by them to be a result of administrative
agency action will be faced with more strenuous requirements in pleadings
and proof. Such increased demands will undoubtedly decrease the number
of persons securing access to challenge agency actions; if so, the apparent
goal of the Court would be accomplished.
Larry Hayes

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Notice of Tort Claim-City
Estopped from Asserting Failure To Comply with Charter
Requirement of Notice Due To Reasonable Reliance
upon Conduct of Unauthorized City Officials
Roberts v. Haltom City,
543 S.W.2d 75 (Tex. 1976).
On May 3, 1973, Audrey Roberts sustained injuries when she tripped and
fell on a street maintained by the municipal corporation of Haltom City.
After a ten-day hospital visit, Mrs. Roberts began to inquire about recovering damages from the city for her injuries and contacted the offices of several
city officials. The chief of police assured her that "everything would be
taken care of," and the assistant to the city manager informed her that the
responsibility rested with private contractors, not with the city. Mrs. Roberts
subsequently discovered that the street workwhich led to her injury was performed by the city, not by an outside contractor. In the interim, however,
the thirty-day period for written notice of tort claims, as set forth in the city
charter,' expired. Despite failure to comply with the charter requirements,
plaintiff filed suit against the city to recover damages for her injuries. The
city moved for summary judgment asserting plaintiff's failure to comply with
the written notice of claim provision. The trial court granted the motion,
1. The Haltom City charter provides in part:
Before the City shall be liable to damage claim or suit for personal injury or
damage to property, the person who is injured or whose property is damaged, or
someone in his behalf, shall give the Mayor or the City Secretary notice in writing
duly verified within thirty days after the occurring of the alleged injury or damage,
stating specifically in such notice when, where and how the injury or damage was
sustained, and setting forth the extent of the injury or damage as accurately as

possible, and giving the names and addresses of all witnesses and upon whose
testimony such person is relying to establish the injury or damage.
Roberts v. Haltom City, 543 S.W.2d 75 (Tex. 1976) (emphasis added).
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and the court of civil appeals affirmed 2 On appeal plaintiff contended that
the city was estopped by the conduct of its officials from asserting failure to
comply with the notice of claim requirement.
Held-Reversed and remanded. A municipal corporation will be estopped from demanding compliance with a notice of claim requirement where officials, unauthorized by the
city charter to receive notice of a tort claim, have, by their conduct, caused
an injured party to reasonably rely on their representations and thereby dis4
pense with the filing of written notice.
The doctrine of governmental immunity from tort claims came under
heavy attack by the American judiciary in the early 19th century, when the
courts developed the distinction between governmental and proprietary functions in an attempt to mitigate the harshness of the immunity concept. 5 A
city was no longer held to be immune from liability for the performance of
proprietary functions, 6 but continued to be sheltered in the performance of
governmental functions. 7 Both national and state legislatures have joined the
judiciary in the general disdain for the inequities caused by sovereign immunity and as a result have enacted tort claim statutes8 providing relief for the
individual injured as a consequence of the performance of certain, governmental functions. 9
Notice of claim requirements are indicative of a municipality's attempt to
restrict its tort liability.' 0 Statutory notice of claim provisions generally set
forth multiple requirements for written notice;" compliance is mandatory and
2. Roberts v. City of Haltom, 529 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1975), rev'd, 543 S.W.2d 75 (Tex. 1976).
3. Roberts v. Haltom City, 543 S.W.2d 75, 76 (Tex. 1976) (estoppel specifically
claimed for the first time in motion for new trial).
4. Id. at 80.
5. Bailey v. Mayor of New York, 15 N.Y. 674, 677 (1842) (making early distinction between acts in the government and private sectors); see Greenhill & Murto, Governmental Immunity, 49 TEXAS L. REV. 462, 463 (1971).
6. Proprietary functions are those powers which are voluntarily assumed in order
to provide private advantage for the locality and its inhabitants. See Smith v. City
of Dallas, 78 S.W.2d 301, 304 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1935, no writ) (operation
of public hospital a proprietary function).
7. Governmental functions are powers the purpose of which is essentially public.
Smith v. City of Dallas, 78 S.W.2d 301, 304 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1935, no writ).
See generally Greenhill & Murto, Governmental Immunity, 49 TEXAs L. REV. 462, 463
(1971) (police and fire protection).
8. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1970), as amended, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680 (Supp. V, 1975); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19 (1970), as amended,
TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19 (Supp. 1976). See generally 1A C. ANTIEAU,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW §§ 1lA.00-.13 (1974) (discussing tort claim legislation
passed in numerous states).
9. The Texas Tort Claims Act provides waiver of immunity in three specific areas:
Injuries resulting from conditions or use of tangible real or personal property, and motor
vehicles used for public purpose. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 3 (Supp.
1976).
10. See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
11. Notice of claim provisions generally require that notice be given to a designated
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is a condition precedent to the right of the injured party to bring an action.12
Failure to file the required notice will deprive the party of his right to sue."8
The Texas Legislature has provided home rule municipal corporations with
a statutory right to create rules and regulations governing the liability of the
governmental unit for tort claims.' 4 Traditionally, Texas has required strict
compliance with notice provisions.' 5 The current trend, however, has allowed
substantial compliance to fulfill the notice of claim mandates, thus abrogating
the obvious inequities which the requirement of strict compliance can create.16
In addition to substantial compliance, the courts have applied the legal
requiredoctrine of equitable estoppel to mitigate the harshness of notice
ments. 7 Estoppel is appropriate where municipal representatives lull the inofficial, in a verified written instrument, within a specific time, period stating specific.
ally when, how, and where the accident occurred. 18 E. McQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.164, at 593-94 (3d ed. rev. 1970). For example of such a charter see
note I supra.
12. City of Terrell v. Howard, 130 Tex. 459, 460, 111 S.W.2d 692, 693 (1938);
Phillips v' City of Abilene, 195 S.W.2d 147, 149 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1946, writ
ref'd).
13. Brantley v. City of Dallas, 498 S.W.2d 452, 453 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974); Wagstaff v. City of Groves,
419 S.W.2d 441, 442 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Phillips v.
City of Abilene, 195 S.W.2d 147, 148-49 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1946, writ ref'd).
See generally IA C. ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW § 11.185, at 11-223
(1974).
14. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1175 (1963), as amended, Tax. REv. Civ. STAT.

ANN. art. 1175 (Supp. 1976). Texas law authorizes cities "to provide for the exemption
from liability on account of any claim for any damages to any person or property,
or to fix such rules and regulations governing the city's liability as may be deemed
advisable." Id.
15. See City of Terrell v. Howard, 130 Tex. 459, 460, 111 S.W.2d 692, 693 (1938)
(notice given 44 days after period elapsed); Phillips v. City of Abilene, 195 S.W.2d 147,
149 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1946, writ ref'd) (oral notice to designated official insufficient).
16. See Ostrewich v. City of Houston, 419 S.W.2d 247, 249 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1967, no writ) (letter setting forth essential facts substantially complied with written notice requirement); City of Wichita Falls v. Williams, 342 S.W.2d
588, 589 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1961, no writ) (description of accident scene
sufficient to enable city to locate defective water meter).
17. See Dias v. City of San Antonio, 488 S.W.2d 522, 523-24 (Tex. Civ. App.San Antonio 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); City of Denison v. Fulce, 437 S.W.2d 277, 284
(Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); City of Waco v. Thralls, 172
S.W.2d 142, 145 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1943, writ ref'd w.o.m.). Another equitable
device that is employed to avoid dismissing a tort claim for failure to comply with notice requirements is waiver. The right which may be intentionally or impliedly waived
is the statutory right of the municipal corporation to demand literal compliance with
notice of claim requirements. It is generally accepted that a municipal corporation may
waive strict compliance with notice provisions, but such waiver must occur during the
period prescribed for the filing of notice. City of Brownsville v. Galvan, 139 Tex.
128, 130, 162 S.W.2d 98, 100 (1942). The defense of waiver may not be validly raised
if the party who allegedly relinquished the municipality's right to strict compliance with
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jured party into a sense of security by leading him to believe that further
action is unnecessary and thereby cause him to subsequently fail to comply
with notice provisions. The application of equitable estoppel against a municipal corporation requires that there be conduct amounting to concealment
or false representation of material facts, intention or expectation of reliance,
and actual or constructive knowledge of the true facts.' 8 Equitable estoppel
has been applied in Texas against a municipal corporation where injustice
would occur if the courts required strict compliance with notice of claim provisions. 19
The injured party seeking to use estoppel as a defense must prove that
he lacked knowledge or means to acquire knowledge of the questioned facts.
He must also prove he relied upon the acts or conduct of municipal officials
and suffered a prejudicial change in position because of such reasonable reliance. 20 Traditionally, Texas courts have not allowed estoppel as a defense
where the misrepresentations leading to reasonable reliance have been made
21
by an unauthorized agent of the municipality.
In Roberts v. Haltom City,2 2 however, the Texas Supreme Court reasoned that estoppel could be applied against a municipal corporation where
an injured party was misled by officials of the city, even though such of
ficials were unauthorized, if a reasonably prudent person would have so
relied. 23 The city was estopped to assert the injured party's failure to comply
with notice requirements where its unauthorized officials misled the plaintiff,
thereby causing her to dispense with the filing of written notice.24 Several
equitable policies guided the court's decision. First, notice requirements may
become traps for the unwary and produce harsh results. 25 In addition, the
doctrine of estoppel is intended to prevent injustice. 26 Finally, the rule requiring authorization of municipal agents before estoppel applies is unjust because it permits cities to benefit from the misleading conduct of their unauthorized agents, thereby avoiding valid tort claims. 27 The rule developed by
notice requirements was not authorized to do so. City of Waco v. Thralls, 172 S.W.2d
142, 145 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1943, writ ref'd w.o.m.).

18. Callahan v. Town of Middleton, 292 S.W.2d 501, 508 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1954),

discussed in 2 C. ANrInEA,

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW § 16A.02, at 16A-6 (1973).

19. See cases cited note 17 supra.

20. E.g., Board of County Comm'rs v. Snellgrove, 428 P.2d 272, 276 (Okla. 1967);
Wheeler v. Brockmeier Co., 418 P.2d 693, 695 (Okla. 1966); Callahan v. Town of

Middleton, 292 S.W.2d 501, 508 (Tenn. Ct.,App. 1954).
21. City of Houston v. Hruska, 155 Tex. 139, 142, 283 S.W.2d 739, 741 (1955);
Phillips v. City of Abilene, 195 S.W.2d 147, 150 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1946, writ
ref'd); Hallman v. City of Pampa, 147 S.W.2d 543, 546 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1941, writ ref'd).
22. Roberts v. Haltom City, 543 S.W.2d 75 (Tex. 1976).
23. Id. at 80.
24. Id. at 80.
25. Id. at 80.
26. Id. at 80.
27. Id. at 81.
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the Roberts court from these premises was designed to allow a broader application of the equitable rule of estoppel in order to "curtail misuse of notice
requirements. ' 28 Such misuse, the court reasoned, created "substantial obstacles to the assertion of damage claims against cities" that could not be "justified by the purposes that notice of claim requirements are intended to
29
serve."
The Roberts decision effectively overrules a previously accepted and uncriticized line of Texas cases which maintained the rule that a claimant may
not depend upon the doctrine of equitable estoppel when he has relied upon
the false representations of an unauthorized agent of the municipal corporation.3 0 The court's adoption of the broader rule, however, extends the doctrine to acts of unauthorized city officials in order to prevent injustice through
the misuse of notice requirements by the municipal corporation. 8 '
Viewed from the standpoint of municipal tort liability claims, the Roberts
decision constitutes a radical change. No longer will municipal corporations
be able to assert the claimant's failure to give notice to designated city officials if the injured party claimant can meet the reasonably prudent man test.' 2
If the claimant acted in a manner consistent with that test in relying on the
false representations of the unauthorized agent, then he may successfully assert equitable estoppel against the municipality. 3"
The reasonably prudent man test is a less strenuous test of compliance than
either strict or substantial compliance standards. The previous tests did not
take into consideration the claimant's knowledge of notice requirements,3 4 but
instead the injured party was presumed to'know the notice requirements and
comply accordingly as a condition precedent to his right to sue.3 5 The reasonably prudent man test, on the other hand, establishes the extent of knowledge required of each claimant and is the standard that is determinative of
whether his reliance and consequent failure to comply with the notice provisions will entitle him to invoke the defense of equitable estoppel.' 6 Each
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 81.
Id. at 80-81.
See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
Roberts v. Haltom City, 543 S.W.2d 75, 81 (Tex. 1976).

32. The reasonably prudent man test is a basic torts concept. See Vaughn v. Men-

love, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (1837) (first case to adopt the test of a "reasonable man of
ordinary prudence"); W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF TH4 LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 149-66

(4th ed. 1971).

33. Roberts v. Haltom City, 543 S.W.2d 75, 80 (Tex. 1976).

34. Ignorantia legis neminem excusiat is accepted in both' courts of equity and law,

otherwise "there would be no limit to the excuse of ignorance, no safety to society
.... " Moreland v. Atchison, 19 Tex. 303, 308 (1857).
35. Brantley v. City of Dallas, 498 S.W.2d 452, 453 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastlahd
1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974); Wagstaff v. City of Groves,

419 S.W.2d 441, 442 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
36. See W. PROssER,

HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS §

32, at 157 (4th ed. 1971)

(delineating standard of knowledge in reasonable prudent man test).
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claimant's knowledge of notice of claim provisions must be compared with
that of the reasonably prudent man. Presumably, if the reasonable prudent
man would not know the notice requirements and would have relied upon
the false representations of the unauthorized municipal officials, then so may
the injured claimant. Obviously, such an objective test is more difficult to
apply than the strict or substantial compliance standards.3 7
The extension of the reasonably prudent man criterion to compliance with
written notice of claim ordinances may abrogate the requirements altogether.
Mr. Justice Pope, dissenting in the Roberts case, reasoned that the court's
adoption of this new rule of compliance eliminates the need for such ordinances.38 Although such a view is undeniably broad, it is not without merit.
Notice of claim requirements have been judicially disfavored in other jurisdictions, 3 9 but unlike those courts the Roberts court resorted to equitable
rather than constitutional principles in reaching its conclusion.4 0
Whether or not the judiciary or the legislature is the proper branch to modify statutory notice provisions is a question which must be examined in determining the future validity of the reasonably prudent man test. Mr. Justice
Pope states in his dissent in Roberts that the legislature created the notice
rules and is therefore the proper body to develop rules such as the majority's
reasonably prudent man test. 41 The legislative-judicial conflict raised by the'
dissent is not a novel concept to written notice of claim requirement disputes. 42 The trend indicates, however, that unless the Texas Legislature
moves affirmatively to abrogate the harshness of notice of claim requirements
the judiciary will, in cases similar to Roberts, continue to apply equitable rem43
edies to prevent injustice through the misuse of notice rules.
-37. Id. § 32, at 166 (application of the reasonable prudent man standard is as "wide
as all human behavior").
38. Roberts v. Haltom City, 543 S.W.2d 75, 81 (Tex. 1976) (dissenting opinion).
(dissenting opinion).
39. Reich v. State Highway Dep't, 194 N.W.2d 700, 703 (Mich. 1972) (equal protection); Turner v. Staggs, 510 P.2d 879, 882 (Nev. 1973); cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1079,
1082 (1974) (unconstitutional deprivation of equal protection). See also Note, Notice
of Claim Provisions: An Equal Protection Perspective, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 417

(1975).
40. See Roberts v. Haltom City, 543 S.W.2d 75 (Tex. 1976).
41. Id. at 81.
42. See Greenhill, Should Governmental Immunity for Torts Be Re-Examined, and,
If So, By Whom?, 31 TEx. B.J. 1036, 1069-70 (1968); Note, Preserving Meritorious
Claims Against Public Corporations: Easing the Harshness of Notice of Claim Requirements, 3 HOFSTRA L. REV. 449, 450-52 (1975).

43. The judicial movement has been from the strict compliance standard of City
of Terrell v. Howard, 130 Tex. 459, 464, 111 S.W.2d 692, 694 (1938), to the substantial
compliance concept, Ostrewich v. City of Houston, 419 S.W.2d 247, 249 (Tex. Civ.

App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1967, no writ), and has culminated in the reasonably prudent man-equitable estoppel test of Roberts v. Haltom City, 543 S.W.2d 75, 81 (Tex.

1976).
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The sweeping judicial extension of the equitable remedy of estoppel in the
instant case 44 may prove too unwieldy when applied to tort claims against
the larger municipalities of Texas. The new rule allowing an unauthorized
agent to bind the city upon estoppel if the claimant meets the reasonably pru45
dent man test could effectively prolong claims for indefinite periods of time.
Additionally, the practical effect of the new rule is to eliminate the need,
and probably the purposes, for such written notice requirements. 40 While
the designated officials of a municipality as small as Haltom City will likely
learn of a claim actually or constructively in a short time due to the small
number of municipal officials, it is conceivable that in a large municipality
the designated officials might never learn of the claim until suit is filed.
Therefore, the population of the city may be an important factor in determining whether the reasonably prudent man test practically eliminates the
necessity for compliance with notice requirements.
The Roberts court has developed a broad new rule of law to determine
municipal tort liability. The total import of the decision will become evident
in subsequent cases where the rule may create an extended controversy based
on a rationale similar to that advocated by the dissent, calling for legislative
relief. 47 In spite of the potential problems advanced by the Roberts decision,
it signals an advancement of legal thinking in Texas to a position of actively
attacking the remaining vestiges of sovereign immunity-vestiges which are
exemplified in notice of claim requirements that have been unjustly utilized
by municipal corporations to avoid valid claims, thereby producing inequitably harsh results.
RichardM. Roberson
44. Roberts v. Haltom City, 543 S.W.2d 75, 81 (Tex. 1976).
45. Id. at 81 (dissenting opinion).
46. Id. at 81 (needs for written notice); see notes 16-18 supra and accompanying
text (discussing purposes for written notice).
47. Roberts v. Haltom City, 543 S.W.2d 75, 81 (1976) (dissenting opinion).
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